Incentives and firm productivity: Exploring multidimensional fiscal incentives in a developing country
In: World development perspectives, Band 5, S. 56-59
ISSN: 2452-2929
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In: World development perspectives, Band 5, S. 56-59
ISSN: 2452-2929
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 168, Heft 4, S. 687
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Environmental management: an international journal for decision makers, scientists, and environmental auditors, Band 10, Heft 5, S. 591-597
ISSN: 1432-1009
In: The Manchester School, Band 39, Heft 3, S. 163-170
ISSN: 1467-9957
In: BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 20/2018
SSRN
This paper explores how fiscal incentives offered to local governments in China affect investment rates in their jurisdictions. Theoretically, we build a simple fiscal competition model to establish the linkage between local fiscal incentives and expenditure policy and consequently, capital movement. The key prediction of the model, borne out by data from Chinese provinces spanning 2004–2013, is that an increase in the local corporate income tax-sharing ratio, which proxies fiscal incentives offered to local governments, motivates local governments to compete for capital investment through increased public expenditures. Our results contribute to the fiscal federalism literature by showing that local fiscal incentives significantly shape policy choices and local economic performance. In addition, by exploring fiscal incentives offered to local governments, we offer a novel explanation for the unusually high investment rate in China that has been sustained over a prolonged period of time.
BASE
In: Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 12-36
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 683-703
ISSN: 1540-5982
Abstract Models of fiscal federalism rarely account for the efficiency implications of intergovernmental fiscal ties for federal tax policy. This paper shows that fiscal institutions such that federal tax deductibility, vertical revenue‐sharing, and fiscal equalization (being common features of existing federations) encourage local taxation, but may discourage federal taxation. Furthermore, the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending. We also show that, when considering Leviathan governments, fiscal institutions reduce confiscatory taxation by the federal government. The result is contrary to the Cartelization Hypothesis (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Finally, we characterize the efficient design of intergovernmental fiscal ties.
This paper explores the characteristics of a range of stylised devolved fiscal systems which have been applied, or proposed, as a means of funding the devolved Scottish Government. The central aim is to identify those schemes that most effectively provide incentives for the pursuit of growth promoting policies by the regional government. Using simulations with an intertemporal, computable general equilibrium model for Scotland, it did not prove possible to uniquely rank a range of devolved fiscal systems in terms of the extent of growth incentive that they provide. Moreover, rather counter-intuitively, tax-sharing regimes do not necessarily improve growth incentives relative to more basic block grants.
BASE
In: Australian quarterly: AQ, Band 57, Heft 3, S. 255
ISSN: 1837-1892
In: Australian quarterly: AQ, Band 57, Heft 3, S. 255
ISSN: 0005-0091, 1443-3605